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Securing Network Coding Architectures against
Pollution Attacks with Band Codes
Attilio Fiandrotti, Member, IEEE, Rossano Gaeta, Marco Grangetto, Senior, IEEE
Abstract—During a pollution attack, malicious nodes purposely
transmit bogus data to the honest nodes to cripple the com-
munication. Securing the communication requires identifying
and isolating the malicious nodes. However, in Network Coding
(NC) architectures, random recombinations at the nodes increase
the probability that honest nodes relay polluted packets. So,
discriminating between honest and malicious nodes to isolate the
latter turns out to be challenging at best. Band Codes (BC) are a
family of rateless codes whose coding window size can be adjusted
to reduce the probability that honest nodes relay polluted packets.
We leverage such property to design a distributed scheme for
identifying the malicious nodes in the network. Each node counts
the number of times each neighbor has been involved in cases
of polluted data reception and exchanges such counts with its
neighbor nodes. Then, each node computes for each neighbor
a discriminative honest score estimating the probability that the
neighbor relays clean packets. We model such probability as a
function of the BC coding window size, showing its impact on the
accuracy and effectiveness of our distributed blacklisting scheme.
We experiment distributing a live video feed in a P2P NC system,
verifying the accuracy of our model and showing that our scheme
allows to secure the network against pollution attacks recovering
near pre-attack video quality.
Index Terms—Network coding, pollution attacks, secure video
communications, peer to peer, distributed scheme
I. INTRODUCTION
NETWORK Coding (NC) [1] has received a lot of atten-tion lately because it increases the effective throughput
of a network. Moreover, random NC enables totally-push
packet scheduling schemes that simplifies the deployment of
peer-to-peer (P2P) content distribution architectures [2]. In
particular, content providers such as YouTube and NetFlix
already generate about 30% of the overall Internet traffic [3], a
figure expected to double by the end of the decade. Therefore,
NC-based P2P architectures are particularly appealing to the
end of distributing video contents to large user populations
by leveraging the users’ resources without deploying ad-hoc
infrastructures [4]. In a random NC-based video streaming
architecture, the video stream is subdivided into independently
encoded chunks called generations, where each generation is
further partitioned in k blocks of identical size. One source
node holds the original video and, for each generation, relays
random linear block combinations to the network nodes as
coded packets. The network nodes buffer the received packets
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and relay random linear combinations thereof to their peer
nodes. Once a node has collected enough packets, it recovers
the generation solving a system of equations.
NC-based architectures are particularly vulnerable to pollu-
tion attacks, where one or more malicious nodes attempt to
cripple the communication by injecting bogus data (polluted
packets) in the network. The recombinations at the nodes
increase the probability that an honest node relays a polluted
packet: if any of the recombined packets is polluted, the
recombined packet is polluted as well. With respect to other
applications, media distribution can tolerate the loss of a few
coding units, so perfect security of the communication may not
be necessary. However, malicious nodes may be able to cripple
the communication polluting just injecting a few packets due
to the recombinations in the network. Such evidence calls for
schemes suitable to distribute media contents with a sufficient
level of security against pollution attacks.
Traditional countermeasures to pollution attacks generally
build upon malicious nodes identification and blacklisting.
First, malicious nodes are identified, for example via ad-hoc
coding schemes or cryptographic approaches, e.g., [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. Second, malicious
nodes are inhibited from further polluting the network via, for
example, blacklisting by a central authority. With random NC,
it is challenging to tell whether the source of a polluted packet
is a malicious node that polluted it on purpose or an honest
node that accidentally relayed a polluted packet (assuming that
polluted packets could be identified in the first place). While
existing solutions to pollution attacks in NC are discussed in
Sec. II, many of them fall short with respect to designing
a video distribution scheme secure to pollution attacks. For
example, cryptographic and coding complexity represent a
drawback when dealing with mobile users. Similarly, the
requirements for a central authority become problematic when
distributing video contents to a large users population.
In our previous work [16] we leveraged Band Codes
(BC) [17] to achieve resilience to pollution attacks of limited
intensity by controlling the coding parameters. BCs are a
family of rateless codes originally devised to control the
decoding complexity as a function of the so-called coding
window size. With BC, the recombinations at the nodes are
constrained to blocks falling within a random window of size
W ≤ k (for W = k, BC resolve to random NC). We showed
that the probability that a node accidentally recombines a
polluted packet decreases withW . Thus, under the assumption
of a limited intensity pollution attack, BC enable the nodes
to decode clean generations without even identifying the
malicious nodes. However, if malicious nodes inject more
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polluted packets, the honest nodes relay enough polluted pack-
ets to make decoding of clean generation almost impossible.
Such shortcoming prompted us to investigate a solution for
identifying and blacklisting malicious nodes suitable for the
case of severe pollution intensity.
The original contribution of this work is a distributed
scheme to identify and blacklist malicious nodes in video
communications leveraging on multiple properties of Band
Codes (BC). By comparison, the goal of [16] was to address
the pollution attacks without identifying the malicious nodes.
Each node computes a honest score for each of its neighbors
as the ratio of clean packets received by the neighbor over all
packets received by the neighbor. Therefore, honest scores lie
in the [0, 1] interval for each neighbor and neighbors that score
closer to 1 are more likely to be honest. Let us associate each
node in the network with a Bernoulli random variable whose
parameter is sh (sp) for honest (malicious) nodes, respectively.
The values sh and sp correspond to the probability that all
the packets provided to the node by honest and malicious
neighbors enable the node to correctly recover a pollution-less
generation. With this in mind, we show that honest scores are
actually estimates for the parameters sh and sp, that each node
can compute for all its neighbors. We also analytically model
sh and sp as a function of the BC coding window W . The
model shows that sh > sp and that both tend to 1 as the coding
window sizeW of BC decreases, i.e.W < k. That is, with BC
the honest score estimator converges to the expected values sh
and sp faster than with random NC, i.e. W = k. Therefore,
as the number of observations available at a node increases,
the node estimates sh and sp with increased accuracy.
In detail, the key highlights of the scheme we propose in this
work are:
• it is totally distributed, so no central authority is needed;
• it is lightweight, since it requires no cryptographic com-
putations and enjoys the low decoding complexity of BC;
• its performance depends only on BC coding parameters
(i.e. generation size k and coding window size W );
• it is suitable for realtime communications to mobile
devices;
• its performance are described by an accurate and vali-
dated mathematical model;
• its expected performance is thoroughly validated in a fully
fledged P2P protocol;
• its ability to identify malicious nodes does not decrease
as the malicious nodes inject more polluted packets into
the network for the values of pollution intensity we
considered.
The paper is organized as follows: Sec. II discusses the
relevant literature whereas Sec. III overviews Band Codes
and our push-based P2P video streaming protocol ToroStream.
Sec. IV describes the attack model and the proposed malicious
nodes identification and blacklisting scheme, whereas Sec. V
contains an analytical model providing the theoretical support
for the proposed scheme. Sec. VI provides an experimental
evaluation of our malicious nodes identification scheme and
validates the relative model. Finally, Sec. VII draws the
conclusions of our work.
For the sake of readability, Tab. I summarizes the key
notation used throughout this paper.
BC parameters
k, k′ Generation size, num. pkts to decode (k′ ≥ k)
W Coding window size (W ≤ k)
f , l Coding window leading and trailing edges
xi i-th data block, i ∈ [1, k]
P i(yi, gi) i-th coded packet (payload, coding vector)
ǫc, Code overhead, ǫc = (k′ − k)/k
ToroStream architecture and attack model
N ; Nh,Nm Tot. num. of nodes; Num. of honest, malicious nodes
ppoll Pkt pollution probability at malicious nodes
Ns Neighborhood size
Proposed method
Si(S
m
i ) Set of (malicious) nodes seen by node Ni
nci,j , npi,j Num. of clean and polluted Ni generations using Nj pkts
ci,j , pi,j Num. of clean and polluted pkts from node Nj to Ni
cj , pj Total num. of clean and polluted pkts from node Nj
sij Honest score of neighbor Nj computed at node Ni
sh, sp Prob. provided pkts yield clean generation (honest, malicious)
tblack Time at which suspect neighbors are blacklisted
α Blacklisting precision-recall control parameter
Mathematical model
c∗←∗i,j , p
∗←∗
i,j model counterpart of counters ci,j and pi,j
c∗i,j , p
∗
i,j model counterpart of counters ci,j and pi,j
chj , p
h
j model counterpart of counters cj and pj (j honest)
cpj , p
p
j model counterpart of counters cj and pj (j malicious)
Experimental settings and variables
No Number of observations available at the nodes
to Duration of the nodes observations
ǫp Pollution overhead
TPR True Positives Rate in malicious nodes identification
CI Continuity Index of the video stream
TABLE I
KEY NOTATION USED IN THE PAPER.
II. RELATED WORKS
Approaches to pollution attacks in NC-based P2P systems
can be broadly classified in three categories.
Cryptographic or algebraic: works in [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11] propose the design of verification techniques
able to detect on-the-fly pollution of received packets. They
require a secure infrastructure to pre-distribute verification
keys and exhibit an high computational cost for verification
thus making them unfit for live (real-time) video streaming
scenarios as the one we consider in our experiments. The
work in [18] represents an improvement over these approaches
by exploiting a homomorphic signature function that enables
intermediate nodes to verify messages and create valid sig-
nature without the need of a secure channel for key pre-
distribution. Nevertheless, computational complexity remains
remarkable. Another improvement over existing approaches
is presented by [19] where the authors propose a lower
complexity tag encoding scheme to enable pollution detection.
Nevertheless, this approach still relies on key pre-distribution.
In [20] two improved key distribution schemes are proposed
and analyzed in terms of computation and communications
costs. The authors of [21] address a weakness of verification-
based techniques known as verification attack, whereby a large
amount of content to be checked is injected at high rate in a
named-data networking scenario.
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Error correction: articles [12], [13], [14] exploit error
correction to recover corrupted received packets. All these
methods add coding redundancy information that enable the
packet receivers to detect and automatically reconstruct the
original data. The price to be paid is a remarkable increase
in the coding overhead; furthermore, the effectiveness of
these approaches heavily depends on the amount of corrupted
information. In [15] the authors propose rateless codes that are
resilient to Byzantine attacks when the fraction of corrupted
packets is bounded above by 1/3. Unlike BC, codes in [15]
do not fully support NC; indeed, the sparsity of encoding
is not preserved when recombinations are performed at each
intermediate node.
Probabilistic: a third approach relies on the capability of
estimating the probability a node is malicious after collecting
several observations on the integrity of received packets and
the packets senders. In this context, [22] developed a dis-
tributed detection algorithm based on intersection operations
of the set of data uploaders to progressively isolate malicious
neighbors of a peer. The method is effective in a static scenario
where neighborhood of peers does not change in time but falls
short of when the overlay network topology is highly dynamic.
Approaches in [23], [24] overcome this limitation by casting
the problem of identifying malicious nodes as a statistical
inference that computes the probability of each peer to be
malicious or not. Nevertheless, since belief propagation is used
as a mean to compute these probabilities the computational
cost of this approach can be substantial. The work in [25]
abstracts from actual pollution defense mechanism and models
the interaction between attackers and defenders with a two-
player strategic game. The final goal is to optimize the resource
allocation to defenders when resources are limited in wireless
networks.
The present work falls in the last class of probabilistic
approaches. Probabilistic approaches are indeed less capable
of guaranteeing complete security against pollution attacks
(e.g., exact recovery of compromised data). However, the
loss-tolerant nature of video communications makes such
approaches fit to strike the performance-complexity trade-
off sufficient for reasonably securing video communications
against pollution attacks.
III. BACKGROUND
This section first overviews those aspects of Band Codes
(BC) [17] that are instrumental to understand the present work.
Then, we describe ToroStream [26] , our random-push NC-
based P2P protocol for low delay video delivery over random
overlays. In the following, we assume that network nodes are
connected by unicast wired links and all coding operations
take place at the application-level of the ISO (layer 5) or OSI
(layer 7) stack.
A. Encoding at the Source
Let us assume that one source node holding the original
video content organizes it into independently encoded and
decodable generations. For example, each generation accounts
for one self-decodable unit of the compressed video bitstream
(i.e., one Groups of Pictures - GOPs). Each generation is fur-
ther divided in k blocks (x1, ..., xk) of the same size, the block
size for example approaching the size of a network packet.
The parameter k defining the number of blocks per generation
(identical for all generations) is known as generation size.
In the following, for the sake of conciseness, we focus on
the encoding and distribution of a single generation of video
as each generation is independently encoded and decoded
following the same approach. Periodically, each node is given
a chance to transmit one packet to the network, which we call
transmission opportunity. At every transmission opportunity,
the source generates a random linear combination of the k
blocks computed as y =
∑k
i=1 gixi, where gi are binary
values and the summation corresponds to bit-wise XORs.
Vector g = (g1, ..., gk) is the coding vector: the number of
non zero elements of g, which corresponds to the number
of blocks encoded in the packet, is known as the packet
degree. The source transmits packets P (g, y) containing i) a
payload y consisting of the encoded blocks and ii) the coding
vector g used to encode y. Clearly, it is key that the coded
payload is received together with the relative coding vector
for the receiver to solve the associated system of equations
and recover the generation.
The blocks to be combined are selected within a random
coding window, i.e. a set of W adjacent blocks, where W ≤ k
(ifW = k, we have random NC). In the following, we call the
first and last block spanned by a coding window the leading
edge and trailing edge of the window and we indicate them
as f and l, respectively. For W < k integer f is drawn from
the distribution
HD(f) =
{
W+1
2k if f = 0 or f = k −W
1
k
if 0 < f < k −W
(1)
such that blocks are equally likely to be encoded [17]. For
W = k, we have HD(f) = 1 only for f = 0. Next, each
block within the coding window is independently drawn such
that P{gi = 1} =
1
2 if f ≤ i ≤ l, gi = 0 otherwise. In the
following, a packet which belongs to a generation of size k
and whose coding vector elements are drawn according to a
coding window of sizeW as described above will be indicated
as BC(k,W ).
B. Recombinations at the Nodes
Every node in the network receives BC coded packets that
are stored into a separate input buffer for each generation. In
order to retain the ability to independently decode each gen-
eration, the recombination process is constrained within each
generation, i.e. only packets pertaining to the same generation
are recombined. In the following we describe the process to
recombine packets pertaining to the same generation at one
network node, the process being identical for all generations.
Let us assume that a node input buffer contains q packets
that are all BC(k,W ). We indicate the q buffered packets
as {P 1, . . . , P i, . . . , P q}, where the i-th packet is defined as
P i = (gi, yi). As for the source node, each network node
is periodically granted one transmission opportunity. When
one transmission opportunity arises, the node creates a novel
coded packet P r(gr, yr) as follows. First, the node draws the
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recombination window leading edge fr (and the corresponding
trailing edge lr = fr + W − 1) according to the same
probability in (1). Then, concerning the i-th packet P i in the
buffer, let si be the first non-null element of the coding vector
gi such that gi
si
= 1 and gij = 0 ∀j < s
i. Similarly, let ti
be the last non-null element of the coding vector gi such that
gi
ti
= 1 and gij = 0 ∀j > t
i. Then, the node independently
draws each scalar ci ∈ {0, 1} such that P{ci = 1} =
1
2
if fr ≤ s
i ≤ ti ≤ lr, and ci = 0 otherwise. Finally, the
recombined packet P r coding vector gr is computed as the
linear combination of the coding vectors of the packets in the
input buffer as gr =
∑q
i=1 cig
i. Similarly, the corresponding
coded payload is computed as yr =
∑q
i=1 ciy
i. Such process
guarantees that P r is still a BC(k,W ), i.e. it preserves the
degree distribution imposed by the source and thus do not alter
the packet decoding complexity.
C. Decoding at the Receivers
The network nodes decode each received packet P (g, y) via
a Gaussian elimination-like algorithm. The algorithm solves a
system of k linear equations GX = Y , where G is the k × k
matrix holding the coding vectors of the received packets, Y
is the k × 1 vector holding the coded payloads and X is the
k × 1 vector holding the original blocks xi once recovered.
We use the notation Gi to indicate the i-th row of G and Gi,j
to indicate the j-th element of Gi. If Gi,j = 0, ∀j, we say that
the i-th row of G is empty and write Gi = ∅. The algorithm is
described in pseudo-code as Alg. 1 and is executed each time
the node receives a packet P (g, y), progressively filling matrix
G with linearly independent equations eventually allowing to
solve for the unknown X . We indicate with gs the first element
of g such that gs = 1 and gi = 0 ∀i < s. If Gs = ∅,
g is placed in the s-th row of G, y is placed in the s-th
row of Y and the algorithm terminates. If Gs is not empty
and if g = Gs, we say that a collision happens at line 8 of
the algorithm (we shall for now overlook lines 9 and 10). If
g = Gs (or, equivalently, y = Ys), then P (g, y) must be a
bitwise copy of (Gs, Ys), so P is dropped and the algorithm
ends at line 11. Otherwise an XOR between g and Gs and
an XOR between y and Ys is executed and the algorithm
is iterated until the resulting equation is placed into G or it
is recognized as linearly dependent on the rows of G, i.e. it
represents redundant or duplicate information. The algorithm
progressively inserts the coding vectors in G that is arranged
in an upper-triangular band matrix, with band equal to W
(hence the name of the BC).
Once k linearly independent packets have been received, i.e.
once the rank of G is equal to k, matrix G is made diagonal
via standard backward-substitution, such that the unknown X
can be determined. After the diagonalization the vector Y
contains the recovered blocks, i.e. Yi = xi, which eventually
allows to recover the generation payload. Due to the random
recombinations at the nodes, not all the packets received by a
node are innovative, i.e. linearly independent from the packets
the node has already collected. In practical applications, it
takes k′ > k packets to recover a generation.
Algorithm 1 Pollution detection provisioned triangularization
1: receive P (g, y).
2: while true do
3: s← position of leading one of g
4: if Gs = ∅ then
5: Gs ← g; Ys ← y
6: return
7: else
8: if g = Gs
9: if y 6= Ys
10: tpoll = tnow
11: return
12: g ← g ⊕Gs; y ← y ⊕ Ys
13: end if
14: end while
D. The ToroStream P2P Protocol
The network nodes exchange coded packets using the
ToroStream [26] P2P protocol. Such protocol is representative
of architectures such as [4], [27] where nodes are organized in
a random, non acyclic, overlay network. Mesh-based, random
overlays are especially sensitive to pollution attacks since a
malicious node could easily spread the pollution to the whole
network. Moreover, there is no easy way to pinpoint the source
of the pollution to a single node lacking any topological
hierarchy. For the above reasons, ToroStream is well suited to
stress the pollution resiliency capabilities of our architecture
designed around BC, which is the goal of the present work.
The overlay network is created under the coordination of
a centralized tracker as follows. A node joins the streaming
session issuing a join request to the tracker. The tracker
maintains a directory of the nodes in the overlay network
while ignoring the actual network topology. The tracker replies
to join requests with a list of node addresses drawn at
random. The joining node contacts the addresses in the list
and, after a handshake, starts exchanging coded packets with
them. Each node is allowed to exchange coded packet with
no more than Ns neighbors per time. If the number of
neighbors of a node exceeds Ns following a handshake, the
node gracefully disconnects from some neighbors selected at
random. Moreover, every node gracefully disconnects from
some neighbors at random and establishes novel connections
at random to guarantee node churning while keeping no more
than Ns neighbors. Such mechanism guarantees that, at any
time, each node has a number of neighbors approximately
equal to Ns. Finally, explicit signaling such as join/leave
requests and periodic keep-alive messages to the tracker make
the protocol robust to network or node failures.
IV. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we first model how pollution propagates
after a pollution attack due to random packets recombinations.
Then, we review how a network node may exploit the BC
decoding process to detect pollution attacks and adjust the BC
coding window size to limit pollution propagation. Next, we
introduce a scheme where a node accumulates and exchanges
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periodic packet counts with its neighbors. Such counts allow
each node to compute a discriminative honest score for each
neighbor, blacklisting and isolating low-scoring nodes.
A. Pollution Attack and Propagation
Fig. 1. Simple network composed of Nh = 3 honest nodes and Nm = 1
malicious node. The malicious node Nj transmits a polluted packet to Nk
that relies a recombination thereof to Ni.
Let a network be composed of N nodes, where Nh nodes
are of the honest type and Nm nodes are of the malicious type,
where Nm+Nh = N . For example, in the network illustrated
in Fig.1, node Nj is malicious whereas all the other nodes are
honest, therefore Nh = 3, Nm = 1, N = 4.
Malicious nodes transmit fake linear combinations yp =∑k
i=1 g
p
i x
p
i to the network, where g
p
i 6= gi and/or x
p
i 6= xi in
the form of polluted packet P (g, yp). To the end of crippling
the communication, altering the payload or the coding vector is
equivalent. However, with BC the degree of the coding vectors
follows a specific distribution and altering it may deceive
the malicious nodes identity. So, we consider a pollution
attack model where at each transmission opportunity each
malicious node alters with probability ppoll the transmitted
packet by randomly flipping the bits of the coded payload. In
Fig.1 the malicious node Nj relays to the honest node Nk
a polluted packet P (g, yp) where the payload yp disagrees
with the encoding vector g. The value of ppoll along with
the number of malicious nodes Nm determines the amount of
polluted packets purposely injected in the network. We define
the pollution overhead ǫp as the ratio between the polluted
and correct packets flowing across the overlay.
The network nodes further propagate the pollution as they
do not know if a packet they received is polluted or not.
Each time a network node draws the received packets for
recombination, it is sufficient that just one of the recombined
packets is polluted for the relayed packet to be polluted as well.
For example, in Fig. 1 the honest node Nk accidentally relays
to Ni a packet which is polluted because Nk has received
a polluted packet from malicious Nj . Recombinations at the
nodes make it difficult to tell whether a node which has relayed
a polluted packet is malicious or is honest and has involuntarily
propagated the pollution.
B. Detecting Pollution Attacks
The network nodes independently detect pollution attacks
while decoding each received packet via Alg. 1. Let us assume
that node Ni in Fig. 1 receives a packet P (g, y) at time tnow.
Node Ni executes Alg. 1 to decode P (g, y), attempting to
insert the coding vector g and the coded payload y in the s-
th row of matrix G and vector Y respectively. If Gs is not
empty (Gs 6= ∅), a collision happens at line 8 and a chance
to detect an ongoing pollution attack arises. If the received
packet coding vector g and Gs are identical, the received
packet P (g, y) and (Gs, Ys) shall represent the same linear
combination of symbols. However, if y and Ys are not bitwise-
identical (line 9), at least one of the packets received so far
for the generation must be polluted. In this case, the algorithm
logs the time at which the pollution attack was detected as tpoll
(line 10) and returns a warning code.
The proposed pollution detection algorithm brings several
advantages. First, no additional complexity is entailed beside a
bitwise comparison between the coding vectors and the coded
payloads. Second, such scheme may enable a node to detect
a pollution attack even before the generation is recovered,
allowing for timely countermeasures. Third, there is a chance
to detect pollution attacks at each algorithm iteration, i.e. there
are multiple chances to detect a pollution attack for each
received packet.
Notice that such pollution detection scheme entails limitations
as well. First, pollution attacks are detected only on a proba-
bilistic basis, i.e. the reception of one or more polluted packets
may go unnoticed. Second, it is not possible to understand
which packet(s) is (are) polluted, so the node shall assume that
all the packets received so far for the generation are polluted.
Nevertheless, in the following we show how probabilistic pol-
lution detection is sufficient to precisely blacklist the malicious
nodes leveraging the properties of BC.
C. Coding to Limit Pollution Propagation
Upon detection of a pollution attack in Alg. 1, each node
adapts its own BC parameters to limit the chances to relay
polluted packets. In the case of Fig. 1, node Nj detects as
pollution attack and broadcasts a warning to its neighbors
including Ni. We indicate with tpoll the time at which node Ni
has either detected a pollution attack or has received a warning
from a neighbor. Let us assume that at time tnow > tpoll a
transmission opportunity arises for node Ni: the difference
tnow − tpoll represents the time since the last evidence of a
pollution attack.
If lots of time has passed since the last pollution evidence,
say tnow− tpoll > tback, Ni assumes that the attack has ended
or its intensity has decreased. Hence, Ni draws the packets to
recombine as detailed in Sec. III-B from a coding window of
size W = k.
If tnow − tpoll < tback, node Ni behaves conservatively
assuming that the last detected pollution attack may be still
going on. Hence, Ni draws the packets to recombine from
a random window of size W = ⌈ k
n
⌉, i.e. W < k, i.e.
Ni constrains the packet recombination to a subset of the
buffered packets. So, Ni decreases the probability to relay
a polluted packet with respect to the case where each packet
is recombined with identical probability as in random NC.
D. Counting Polluted Packets and Exchanging Observations
With reference to Fig. 1, node Ni has (or has had at some
point in time) node Nj among its neighbors: we say that Ni
has seen Nj . In the following, we indicate as Si the set of
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nodes seen by Ni and as S
m
i the set of malicious nodes seen
by Ni: clearly, S
m
i is a subset of Si and |S
m
i | indicates its
cardinality. For example, in the case in Fig. 1, we have Si =
{Nj ,Nk} and S
m
i = {Nj}.
We define as observation vector the vector indicating how
many clean and polluted packets a node has received from
each neighbor it has seen according to the output of Alg. 1.
We recall that the algorithm only detects pollution attacks on a
probabilistic basis. Namely, the algorithm flags a generation as
polluted only if the attack is actually detected and provides no
information on which packet(s) is (are) actually polluted. So, in
the following all packets received for a generation flagged as
polluted by Alg. 1 will be considered polluted to account for a
caution criteria. With reference to node Ni in Fig. 1, (ci,j , pi,j)
indicates the number of clean and polluted packets transmitted
by Nj to Ni. Note that similarly, with reference to node Nk,
(ck,j , pk,j) indicates the number of clean and polluted packets
transmitted by Nj to Nk. So, the whole observation vector of
Ni is Vi = {(ci,j , pi,j), (ci,k, pi,k)}. Node Nl does not appear
in Ni observation vector because in our example Ni has never
seen Nl.
We assume that the nodes are allowed exchange the respective
observation vectors on a periodic basis or on handshakes at
least. Depending on constraints such as bandwidth, nodes
may piggyback their observations to other messages or relay
differential descriptions of their observation vectors.
E. Distributed Identification and Blacklisting Scheme
The scheme that allows a network node to independently
identify and blacklist its malicious neighbors is as follows.
Let us assume that in the case of Fig. 1 Ni and Nk exchange
the respective observation vectors. At this point Ni has an
estimate of the total number of good and polluted packets
received from Nj and Nk. Let node Ni compute
cj = ci,j +
∑
Nq∈Si
cq,j , (2)
as the total number of clean packets transmitted by Nj to Ni
and all the nodes seen by Ni which have also seen Nj . In a
totally analogous way, let us define
pj = pi,j +
∑
Nq∈Si
pq,j . (3)
We define
sij =
cj
pj + cj
, j 6= i (4)
as the honest score of node Nj computed at node Ni. Such
score represents the fraction of clean packets transmitted by
Nj to Ni and all the nodes that exchanged their observations
with Ni. Node Ni may sort the computed scores in increasing
order, i.e. nodes that have uploaded more packets for polluted
generations are listed before the others.
After collecting enough observations, Ni proceeds to black-
listing neighbors with lower score as follows. Let us assume
that tblack seconds after detecting the pollution attack, node
Ni computes the relative score sij as defined above for
each neighbor Nj it has seen. Next, Ni computes the mean
neighbor score and the relative standard deviation as µ and σ,
respectively. Let us define as honest score threshold
θp = α σ + µ, (5)
where α is a factor that can be adjusted to regulate the tradeoff
between precision and recall in malicious nodes identification
as described below. If node Nj score s
i
j is such that s
i
j ≥ θp,
then Nj is considered honest. Otherwise, node Nj is to be
considered as malicious and is blacklisted in two steps as
follows.
As a first step, Ni immediately discards all the buffered pack-
ets received from Nj for any generation. Therefore, packets
received from Nj , more likely to be polluted, cannot be drawn
for recombination and relayed any further. Next, for each
generation, matrix G and vector Y are flushed and the buffered
packets that were not discarded are decoded again via Alg. 1.
This reduces the probability that the recovered generation
payload is corrupted due to the reception of polluted packets
from Nj .
As a second step, Nj is permanently isolated from Ni as
follows. First, Ni gracefully removes Nj from its neighbor-
hood. Second, Ni will reject any novel neighborhood request
that shall come from Nj in the future. That is, Ni will not
receive any coded packet directly from Nj for the rest of
the communication. Assuming that Nj is similarly blacklisted
by all the other nodes in the network, Nj will be isolated
from the rest of the network and will be unable to relay
polluted packets. Therefore, removal of blacklisted nodes from
the overlay becomes superfluous to the end of containing the
pollution attack.
F. Reference Centralized Scheme
Finally, we propose a reference centralized counterpart of
our distributed blacklisting scheme. On a periodic basis, the
nodes envoy their observations exclusively to the tracker, that
acts as a trusted central authority. After tblack seconds the
streaming session has begun, the tracker computes the overall
number of polluted and clean packets pj and cj contributed by
each j-th node in the network to each i-th node that provided
its observation vectors. Next, the tracker centrally computes a
score scj for each j-th node in the network according to (4) and
permanently blacklists nodes for which scj < θp. Namely, each
time a blacklisted node requires novel neighbor address(es) to
the tracker, the tracker ignores the request. Also, each time an
honest node requires novel neighbor address(es) to the tracker,
the tracker never forwards the address of blacklisted nodes.
Because all the nodes periodically drop parts of their neighbors
at random, malicious nodes are gradually isolated from the rest
of the network.
G. Why Does it Work?
Finally, we provide the theoretical ground required to un-
derstand how node Ni can discern malicious from honest
neighbors by thresholding scores. To this end, we associate
each network node with a Bernoulli random variable whose
parameter is sh for honest nodes and sp for malicious nodes.
We use sh (sp) to represent the probability that packets
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provided by the honest (malicious) neighbor Nj result in a
clean recovered generation at Ni. The honest score s
i
j we
defined in (4) is the fraction of packets provided by Nj to Ni
that yield the decoding of a clean generation. Honest score
sij can thus be thought of Ni’s estimate of the probability sh
(sp) that Nj is a honest (malicious) neighbor. Thanks to the
homogeneity and regularity of the overlay network organized
by ToroStream, it follows that all sij computed by Ni for its
honest neighbors will converge in the long run to the same
value sh. Analogously, all s
i
j computed by Ni for its malicious
neighbors will tend to sp.
To understand why the proposed score-based blacklist-
ing method is effective, we denote as nci,j and npi,j the
number of clean and polluted generations decoded by Ni
using at least one packet transmitted by Nj . Similarly to
the definition of cj , pj in Sec. IV-E, we can then define
ncj = nci,j +
∑
Nq∈Si
ncq,j as the number of clean gen-
erations contributed by Nj to all of its neighbors (similarly,
npj = npi,j +
∑
Nq∈Si
npq,j).
If we assume Nj is malicious, it is well known that for a
large sample size, i.e. if enough observations were collected,
the sample distribution of the honest score sij estimator can be
approximated asN (sp,
sp(1−sp)
ncj+npj
), i.e., as a Normal distribution
with mean value sp and variance equal to the scaled variance
of the Bernoulli random variable to estimate [28]. As the sam-
ple size ncj+npj gets larger, the probability s
i
j ≥ θp decreases
with the variance sp(1 − sp). Furthermore, the convergence
rate depends on the variance that peaks its maximum for
sh = 0.5 (or sp = 0.5). That is, for infinitely long experiments
(i.e., infinite observations) the probability that sij ≥ θp (if
Nj is malicious) tends to 0 and Ni will correctly identify
all malicious neighbors. In the practical case of finite time
experiments, the rate of convergence of sij depends on how
distant sp is from 1.
The model we develop in Sec. V will reveal that i) both sh
and sp tend to 1 asW decreases, and ii) sh > sp. Such findings
suggest that for random NC (W = k), sh and sp are both
approximately 0.5, so more observations are required to avoid
sij ≥ θp ifNj is malicious, i.e., to avoid false negatives. On the
contrary, with BC (W < k) sh and sp get increasingly close
to 1 as W decreases. So, given the same experiment length,
BC will enable to identify malicious nodes more precisely than
random NC since higher variance increases the tail probability
that sij ≥ θp for the case Nj is malicious.
V. MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR sh AND sp
In this section we develop a mathematical model aimed at
characterizing the values of sh and sp as a function of system
parameters. The model development is carried out in five steps:
• with reference to Sec. III-B we derive the probability psl
that one of the packets stored in a node input buffer for
a generation is selected for recombination (Sec. V-A);
• we then exploit psl to obtain the probability prp(q)
that a node creates a polluted recombined packet for a
generation when q BC(k,W ) packets are stored in its
input buffer (Sec. V-B);
• we consider a sequence of recombinations for a given
generation and from prp(q) we derive the average prob-
ability a node creates and relays a recombined polluted
packet prl (Sec. V-C);
• we focus on a generic node N and by exploiting prl
we derive and expression to describe the average number
of packets provided to N by one of its honest uploader
that result in clean and polluted decoded generation. We
further extend this derivation to one of the malicious
neighbors of N (Sec. V-D);
• finally, we focus on any pair of randomly chosen nodes
Ni and Nj and we consider all cases where Ni and
Nj can be honest or malicious in order to derive an
expression for the sh and sp (Sec. V-E). Please note that
the ToroStream protocol described in Sec.III-D lets us
view the overlay network as a regular random graph [29]
wherein the degree of all nodes is equal to Ns and where
all neighborhoods are completely randomly determined,
i.e., any peer can be connected to any other with the
same probability. This means that the overlay network is
symmetric since all nodes in the system are homogeneous
and statistically indistinguishable with respect to how
many and which neighbors are connected to it. Therefore,
the analytical expressions for sh and sp we derive do not
depend on a particular choice of nodes Ni and Nj since
any other pair of nodes would yield the same quantities.
In Sec. VI we numerically show that sh > sp and that smaller
BC coding windows W yield sh and sp values closer to 1. In
the sequel we denote as Bn,xp =
(
n
x
)
px(1−p)n−x the binomial
probability distribution with parameters n, p computed in x.
Similarly, we denote as HN1,N2,...,Nan1,n2,...,na =
(N1n1)(
N2
n2
)...(Nana)
(N1+N2+...+Nan1+n2+...+na )
the
multivariate hypergeometric distribution with a populations
whose sizes are N1, N2, . . . Na. Furthermore, to avoid clutter-
ing the notation we omit the explicit dependence of all derived
probabilities on k and W .
A. Probability of selecting a packet for recombination
We consider a generic nodeN ; as discussed in Sec. III-B,N
first draws the recombination window leading edge fr (and the
corresponding trailing edge lr = fr+W −1) according to (1).
Packet P i in the buffer is actually selected for recombination
with probability 12 only if fr ≤ s
i ≤ ti ≤ lr (we recall from
Sec. III-B that scalar ci ∈ {0, 1} is such that P{ci = 1} =
1
2
if fr ≤ s
i ≤ ti ≤ lr, and ci = 0 otherwise). The probability
that the structure of a BC(k,W ) packet P i satisfies fr ≤
si ≤ ti ≤ lr is
pst(fr, s
i, ti) =
{
2t
i
−si−1
2W−1
ti − si > 0
1
2W−1
ti − si = 0
This means that the probability packet P i is eligible for
recombination when a leading edge fd is drawn is
pel(fd) =
lr∑
si=fd
lr∑
ti=si
k−W∑
fr=0
HD(fr) · pst(fr, s
i
, t
i)
Thus, according to the recombination algorithm described in
Sec. III-B, the probability packet P i is actually selected by
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N for recombination is given by
psl =
k−W∑
fd=0
HD(fd)pel(fd)
2
. (6)
B. Probability a node creates a polluted recombined packet
Here we derive the probability prp(q) node N creates a
recombined polluted packet for a given generation when it
has q packets in its input buffer. To this end, we consider a
scenario where:
• the number of neighbors of N is equal to Ns and all
neighbors upload packets for a generation;
• the neighborhood of N includes m malicious neighbors;
• node N input buffer contains q packets for the considered
generation that have been provided by its Ns neighbors.
We assume there are 0 ≤ qm ≤ q packets provided by the
m malicious neighbors and the remaining q−qm packets
provided by Ns −m honest neighbors;
• malicious neighbors of N may have modified packets
they transmitted with probability ppoll;
• the distance between node N and the video source is
equal to d hops (when N is a neighbor of the video
source d = 1);
• all neighbors of N may have relayed a polluted
BC(k,W ) packet they created with probability prl(d −
1). In Sec. V-C we derive a recursive expression for
prl(d).
In this scenario, the probability that all the selected packets
provided by the m malicious neighbors of N are clean is
pcp(qm, d) =
qm∑
b=0
Bqm,bpsl [(1− ppoll)(1− prl(d− 1))]
b, (7)
i.e., none of the selected packets received by N from a mali-
cious neighbor has been voluntarily altered (factor (1−ppoll)b)
and none has been created and relayed as polluted (factor
(1−prl(d−1))
b). Similarly, the probability that all the packets
provided by honest neighbors selected by N are clean is
pch(qm, d) =
q−qm∑
b=0
Bq−qm,bpsl (1− prl(d− 1))
b. (8)
In this case, honest nodes may have created and relayed a
recombined packet where at least one of the selected packets
was polluted. It follows that the probability node N creates a
recombined polluted packet when m out of its Ns neighbors
are malicious is obtained by averaging over all possible values
of qm and over the probability that the neighborhood of node
N includes m malicious neighbors as
prp(q, d)=
min(Nm,Ns)∑
m=0
HNh,NmNs−m,m
q∑
qm=0
Bq,qmm
Ns
[1−pcp(qm, d)pch(qm, d)].
(9)
This averaging is based on the assumption that the neighbor-
hood creation of a node is completely random and can thus
be modeled as a sampling without replacement of Ns nodes,
operated by the tracker, among all nodes in the system.
C. Average probability to recombine and relay a polluted
packet
The number of BC(k,W ) packets in the input buffer of
node N for a given generation increases as long as de-
coding does not occur. This means that N creates multiple
recombined packets for a given generation each time using a
different (increased) input buffer occupancy q. This also means
that the probability N creates a polluted recombined packet
prp(q, d) increases with time; it is thus a sensible choice to
define an average probability for a node to create and relay a
recombined polluted packet.
To achieve this goal we can represent this time-dependent
process by a recombination sequence q = (q1, q2, . . . qnr )
where nr > 0 represents the number of recombination rounds
operated by node N for a given generation, with the con-
straints that q1 > 0, qnr ≥ k, and ∀i ∈ [1, nr − 1], qi < qi+1.
The definition of a recombination sequence can be further
restricted by considering that:
• the overall upload bandwidth of nodes is equal to Bu
Mbit/s;
• the size of a BC(k,W ) packet is equal to PS kbit;
• each node N uses a scheduler that is cyclically activated
each tsched seconds to create and upload recombined
packets to its neighbors. This means that a node runs
1
tsched
recombination rounds each second.
If we assume that each node equally shares its upload
bandwidth among its Ns neighbors then we find that the
overall download bandwidth of nodes is equal to Bu, as
well. This implies that each node fills its input buffer at a
rate equal to Bu
PS
packets/s that translates to δq =
tschedBu
PS
packets/recombination round. This observation allows us to
further constraint the definition of a recombination sequence
q by imposing that ∀i ∈ [2, nr], qi = qi−1 + δq .
For a recombination sequence q we define two quantities:
• the average value of probability prp(q, d) defined as
prp(q, d) =
∑nr
i=1
prp(qi,d)
nr
;
• the weight associated to each q that we define as w(q) =
ξ(qnr ), where ξ(k
′
nr
) = 1 −
∑k′nr
k′=1 τ(k
′) denotes the
probability that decoding has not occurred when k′nr
BC(k,W ) have been collected (here τ(k′) is the prob-
ability that a generation is decoded upon the receipt of
the k′−th packet). This also serve to model the fact that
creation of recombined packets stops after decoding.
It follows we can define the average probability node N
creates and relays a recombined polluted packet prl(d) by
computing the weighted average of prp(q, d) over all possible
recombination sequences q, that is
prl(d) =
∑
q w(q)prp(q, d)∑
q w(q)
(10)
It can be noted that (10) recursively defines prl(d) since (7),
(8), and (9) all depend on prl(d − 1). We thus complete the
recursive definition of prl(d) with the base case prl(0) = 0,
i.e., nodes connected to the video source can only receive
polluted packets from polluter neighbors (besides the video
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source) that voluntarily alter packets with probability ppoll and
there is no honest node relaying polluted recombined packets.
D. Average number of packets to decode one generation
We consider a generic node N whose neighborhood in-
cludes m malicious neighbors. We focus on the generations
it decodes and we assume that q BC(k,W ) packets stored in
its input buffer allowed node N to decode a single reference
generation. In this setting, we can write the expression for the
average number of packets provided to N by one of its honest
neighbors when a single clean generation is decoded as
ch(m)=
∞∑
q=k
τ(q)
q∑
qm=0
Bq,qmm
Ns
(1−ppoll)
qm(1−prl(d))
q
(
q − qm
Ns −m
)
.
(11)
Eq. 11 weights the average number of packets provided by
each honest uploader (factor q−qm
Ns−m
) by the probability that the
generation does not contain polluted packets (probability (1−
ppoll)
qm(1−prl(d))
q). It also averages over all possible values
of BC(k,W ) packets provided to N by malicious neighbors
and over all possible values of packets in the input buffer that
are required for decoding.
Similar reasonings allow one to derive an expression for
the average number of packets provided to N by one of
its honest neighbors when a single polluted generation is
recovered (denoted as ph(m)): it suffices to replace in (11)
the probability of clean decoding by its complement 1 −
(1 − ppoll)
qm(1 − prl(d))
q . In the same vein, two analogous
quantities for one of the malicious neighbors of N can be
derived: cp(m) can be obtained from (11) and pp(m) from
ph(m) by substituting factor q−qm
Ns−m
with qm
m
in both.
E. An expression for sh and sp
We now consider any two randomly chosen nodes Ni and
Nj to derive an expression for the honest score s
i
j . Since
nodes are homogeneous and statistically indistinguishable with
respect to how many and which neighbors are connected to it,
the expression for sij we derive does not depend on a particular
choice of i and j and it can be used to characterize parameters
sh and sp. To this end, we first characterize the number of
clean and polluted packets transmitted by Nj to Ni for a single
generation.
We focus on the cases where Nj is in the neigh-
borhood of Ni and consider the composition of the re-
maining Ns − 1 nodes to properly average the values of
ch(m), ph(m), cp(m), pp(m).
We first consider Nj as an honest node that provides packets
to an honest Ni; in this case we define the number of clean
packets Nj provides to Ni as
ch←hi,j =
min(Nm,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh−2,Nm,1Ns−m−1,m,1c
h(m)
min(Nm,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh−2,Nm,1Ns−m−1,m,1
(12)
Analogously, we derive ph←hi,j (defined as the number of
polluted packets from Nj to Ni) by replacing c
h(m) with
ph(m) in (12). Please note, that ch←hi,j and p
h←h
i,j are the model
counterpart of counters ci,j and pi,j defined in Sec.IV-D. If
Ni is malicious we obtain
cp←hi,j =
min(Nm−1,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh−1,Nm−1,1Ns−m−1,m,1 c
h(m)
min(Nm−1,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh−1,Nm−1,1Ns−m−1,m,1
(13)
and pp←hi,j is computed by replacing c
h(m) with ph(m) in (13).
The case where Nj is malicious is similar but with an
important difference: when averaging over all values of m
in the neighborhood the quantities to be averaged must be
computed for m+1 malicious neighbors and not for m since
Nj is malicious itself. So, when Ni is honest we obtain
ch←pi,j =
min(Nm−1,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh−1,Nm−1,1Ns−m−1,m,1 c
p(m+ 1)
min(Nm−1,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh−1,Nm−1,1Ns−m−1,m,1
. (14)
Again, pp(m+1) replaces cp(m+1) in the definition of ph←pi,j
while if Ni is malicious we have
cp←pi,j =
min(Nm−2,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh,Nm−2,1Ns−m−1,m,1c
p(m+ 1)
min(Nm−2,Ns−1)∑
m=0
HNh,Nm−2,1Ns−m−1,m,1
(15)
with pp←pi,j obtained by substituting c
p(m+ 1) by pp(m+ 1).
All previously defined quantities c∗←∗i,j and p
∗←∗
i,j are the
model counterpart of counters ci,j and pi,j defined in Sec.IV-D
for all possible honest/malicious combinations; they all must
be weighted for the relative population sizes to obtain the
overall number of clean and polluted packets as
chi,j = c
h←h
i,j
Nh − 1
Nh +Nm − 1
+ cp←hi,j
Nm
Nh +Nm − 1
cpi,j = c
h←p
i,j
Nh
Nh +Nm − 1
+ cp←pi,j
Nm − 1
Nh +Nm − 1
phi,j = p
h←h
i,j
Nh − 1
Nh +Nm − 1
+ pp←hi,j
Nm
Nh +Nm − 1
ppi,j = p
h←p
i,j
Nh
Nh +Nm − 1
+ pp←pi,j
Nm − 1
Nh +Nm − 1
(16)
According to the definitions (2) and (3) given in Sec. IV-E, we
define the total number of clean packets transmitted by Nj to
Ni and all the nodes seen by Ni (Nq ∈ Si) which have also
seen Nj : in the case node Nj is honest we obtain
chj = c
h
i,j

nci,j + npi,j + ∑
Nq∈Si
(ncq,j + npq,j)

 , (17)
where ncx,j denotes the overall number of generations de-
coded by Nx when Nj uploaded packets to it as defined in
Sec. IV-G. Analogously, we define
phj = p
h
i,j

nci,j + npi,j + ∑
Nq∈Si
(ncq,j + npq,j)

 . (18)
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To write (17) and (18) we exploited the homogeneity and
regularity properties of nodes in ToroStream, i.e., ∀Nq ∈ Si :
chi,j = c
h
q,j ∧ p
h
i,j = p
h
q,j . Similar expressions can be written
for cpj and p
p
j in the case node Nj is malicious by replacing
chx,j and p
h
x,j by c
p
x,j and p
p
x,j , respectively.
According to (4), we finally define the probability that
packets provided by Nj to Ni result in a clean recovered
generation when Nj is honest as
sij =
chj
chj + p
h
j
=
chi,j
chi,j + p
h
i,j
= sh (19)
Similarly, when Nj is a polluter we obtain
sij =
cpj
cpj + p
p
j
=
cpi,j
cpi,j + p
p
i,j
= sp. (20)
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we first define the scenario we consider show-
ing how pollution propagates depending on BC parameters.
Afterwards, we exploit the model in Sec. V to predict the
performance of the proposed identification method. Finally,
we used the actual prototype to both validate the model
prediction and to analyze the effects of protocol parameters
on the accuracy of the identification technique.
A. Experimental scenario
We consider a network with N=1000 nodes where Nm =
20 are malicious and Nh = N − Nm = 980 are honest. The
neighborhood of each node is constrained to Ns = 25 nodes
and each malicious node alters the payload of each transmitted
packet with probability ppoll = 1%. We stream a live video by
means of the ToroStream P2P protocol described in Sec. III-D.
The protocol is implemented as a realtime multi-threaded C++
Linux application that we deploy over a 64-cores server with
128 GB of RAM and a fast array of RAID disks. Such
setup allows us to capture in realtime the complex interactions
between coding, packet scheduling and other aspects of a real
P2P live video distribution architecture.
We encode a video feed at a constant rate of 500 kbit/s
where each node can exploit an upload bandwidth up to
Bu = 1 Mbit/s. The video stream is divided in generations
of k blocks each, where each generation encompasses one
or more self-decodable Groups of Pictures (GoPs). At each
transmission opportunity, the server node encodes a packet as
described in Sec. III-A (with W = k at start-up) and uploads
it to a random peer node. The server seeds coded packets for
each generation of the video stream for an amount of time
corresponding to the generation playout duration. Periodically
(once every tsched = 100 ms) each peer node transmits a novel
BC packet out of its locally buffered packets to a neighbor
drawn at random. Whenever a transmission opportunity arises,
each malicious node randomly flips the bits of the coded
video payload with probability ppoll as described in Sec. IV;
otherwise, it behaves as an honest node. Each node decodes the
received packets using the pollution detection capable Alg. 1
and broadcasts a message to its neighbors whenever it detects
a polluted generation.
B. Pollution Propagation Analysis
As a first set of experiments, we investigate how the
pollution propagates through the network as a function of the
generation size k and coding window size W . Let us define
the pollution overhead ǫp as the fraction of relayed packets
that are polluted. The coding overhead ǫc =
k′−k
k
represents
instead the fraction of packets relayed by a node that are non-
innovative at the recipient. Fig. 2 (left) shows the attainable
ǫp - ǫc tradeoff as a function of W and k. Only 20 nodes
out of 1000 are malicious, and each malicious node pollutes
on average 1% of the transmitted packets, so the pollution
overhead due to the malicious nodes activity amounts to just
0.02% of the overall traffic. The RNC curve refers to a RNC
scheme where the nodes relay random linear combinations of
the received packets (i.e.,W = k). The other three curves refer
to the BC-based scheme described in this work and account
for three different coding window sizes W ∈ { 2k3 ,
k
2 ,
k
3}. We
see that with BC the pollution overhead is about 10 times
lower than with RNC, and decreases with the window size W .
Most important, we observe that small W and k values yield
the sought conditions for correctly identifying the malicious
nodes. However, small k also impair the code efficiency be-
cause the nodes exchange fewer innovative packets increasing
the coding overhead (right figure). Therefore, in the rest of
our experiments we consider generations of 250 kbit (k=25
blocks, as each block accounts for 10 kbit of video payload)
and a packets size PS = 10 kbit as a reasonable tradeoff
between coding and pollution overhead.
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Fig. 2. Pollution overhead ǫp and coding overhead ǫc as a function of the
of the generation size k [kbit] and coding window size W [blocks].
C. Honest Score Model Exploitation
The model we developed in Sec. V, through (19) and (20),
allows us to predict the value of the honest score estimated by
each node. As already discussed this amounts at estimating the
system-wide parameters sh and sp. Table II (leftmost columns)
shows the values obtained with (19) and (20), computed by
setting the model parameters according to the scenario defined
in Secs. VI-A and VI-B. These evaluations depend on (10) and
(11) that require the knowledge of τ(k′), i.e. the decoding
probability of BC(k,W ). To the best of our knowledge there
is not an analytical expression for such probability. Therefore,
we numerically computed it by repeated decoding trials simu-
lation for a range of coding window sizes W ∈ {k, 2k3 ,
k
2 ,
k
3}.
It can be noted that the model predicts that sh > sp for
all values of W we considered, thus suggesting that the
proposed identification mechanism is able to discern honest
from malicious in the long term. Furthermore, the model
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results also show that both sh and sp tend to 1 asW decreases;
according to the remarks in Sec. IV-G, this means that the rate
of convergence of the estimates increases as W decreases. In
particular, the model results show that for RNC (W = k),
sh and sp are both approximately 0.5, so more observations
are required to avoid that sij ≥ θp if Nj is malicious, i.e., to
reduce false negatives. On the contrary, with BC (W < k) sh
and sp get increasingly close to 1 as the coding window size
W is reduced.
Obviously, the proposed model must be validated against
real data obtained by running our prototype. To this end we
perform a 300 s long trial with our prototype; at the end ot the
experiment we collect and average the honest scores for all Nh
honest and Nm malicious nodes to obtain values comparable
with those from (19) and (20). The measured values are show
in the rightmost part of Table II. It can be noted that the model
prediction and the real data are in very good agreement. To
further support the model prediction, in Fig. 3 we show the
honest scores computed by a randomly chosen honest node for
RNC (W = k) and BC with W = k/2. The honest scores are
ordered on the x axis from the lowest to the highest and honest
scores corresponding to malicious nodes are represented with
a red circle. The dashed line represents the decision threshold
in (5) for α = 2.0. With RNC, on the average, honest scores
are lower as correctly predicted by our model (see Table II).
Moreover, the honest score of several malicious nodes are
higher than the decision threshold, i.e. honest scores do not
properly allow to discriminate between honest and malicious
nodes. This is a consequence of having both sh and sp very
close to 12 (sh = 0.511453 and sp = 0.47911). Conversely,
with BC the honest scores of malicious nodes are more clearly
clustered around values lower than those of honest nodes.
Such behavior is the key for blacklisting malicious nodes
in reasonable time, as we will experimentally prove in the
following.
W model sij (measured)
sp sh Malicious Honest
k
3
0.926249 0.948308 0.923849 0.95452
k
2
0.915887 0.935425 0.895789 0.927744
2k
3
0.886283 0.904738 0.852016 0.882849
k 0.463819 0.473402 0.47911 0.511453
TABLE II
HONEST SCORE PREDICTED BY (19) AND (20) (LEFT) AND VALUES
COMPUTED BY PROTOTYPE (RIGHT) FOR VARYING W .
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Fig. 3. Computed honest scores for different coding schemes (to = 300 s).
D. Malicious Nodes Identification
As a second experiment, we assess how precise is our
scheme in identifying the malicious nodes as the True Positives
Ratio (TPR) of the nodes identified as malicious. For each
i-th network node we define the TPR as the fraction of true
malicious nodes among the top-|Smi | nodes in the sorted scores
list, where |Smi | is the subset of malicious nodes actually
seen by the i-th node according to the ground truth (in the
following, we report the TPR averaged over all the network).
Namely, we study the effect of the nodes observation time to
and number of observations No available at a node.
First, after an observation time of to = 300 s , each node
Ni requests (No − 1) other random nodes their observation
vectors and computes a sorted list of suspected malicious
neighbors, albeit no node blacklisting is enforced not to bias
the malicious nodes identification process. Fig. 4 (left) shows
the TPR as a function of No (when No=1, a node relies
on its own observations only). As a general trend, malicious
nodes are identified with increasing precision (i.e., the TPR
increases) as No increases. However, the precision of the
RNC scheme increases linearly only with No: even with
No=200 observations available at each node, the TPR barely
exceeds 50%. With RNC, honest nodes relay a lot of polluted
packets, as Fig. 2 (left) shows. Thus, collected observations
are unreliable and useless to discriminate between the honest
and the malicious nodes. On the contrary, the BC schemes
precisely identify (TPR between 90% and 100%) the malicious
nodes with just about No = 100 observations. With BC, honest
nodes relay fewer polluted packets as Fig. 2 (left) shows. Thus,
observations are more reliable, enabling to precisely identify
malicious nodes.
Similarly, Fig. 4 (right) shows the TPR as a function of
the observation time to when No ≤ 75. With RNC, even
large to increases bring however modest TPR improvements
only. Fig. 2 (top) shows that honest nodes relay many polluted
packets with the RNC scheme, thus the observations are
unreliable. That is, with RNC it is difficult to identify the
malicious nodes even over long observation time because the
exchanged observations are not discriminative. Conversely,
with BC the malicious nodes are precisely identified over short
time (e.g.: with W = k/3, the TPR is equal to 97% after 300
seconds). Fig. 2 (top) shows in fact that the nodes relays a
limited number of polluted packets, therefore the exchanged
observations are reliable. That is, with BC the malicious nodes
are quickly identified because the exchanged observations are
highly discriminative.
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Fig. 4. TPR as a function of the number of observations collected from the
other nodes No for different coding schemes (to = 300 s) and as a function
of the observation time to for different coding schemes (No = 75).
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E. Malicious Nodes Blacklisting
As a third and last set of experiments, we assess the
effectiveness of our malicious nodes blacklisting scheme.
First, we evaluate to which extent blacklisting malicious
nodes improves the video quality. Each node computes the
score for each neighbor observed so far, tblack s after joining
the streaming session. Next, the node blacklists the neigh-
bors with lower score according to the criteria described in
Sec. IV-E. In all the following experiments, we set α =
2.0 in (5), which yields the score threshold corresponding
to the dashed line in Fig. 3. Such α value enables a rea-
sonable tradeoff between blacklisting recall and precision for
different coding parameters, as the figure suggests. We define
as Continuity Index (CI) the average fraction of generations
successfully recovered by all the nodes. Only generations
recovered entirely, prior to the respective decoding deadlines
and without polluted packets are successfully recovered. In the
considered video streaming application, the CI corresponds to
the inverse of the screen freezes frequency due to corrupted
generations of video data. Fig. 6 (left) shows the CI as
a function of the blacklisting time tblack and for different
encoding window sizes W . The reported CI is computed, for
each node, only over generations distributed by the server
after tblack, i.e. after the blacklisting has been enforced. The
case tblack=0 refers to the scenario where no blacklisting is
performed at all and serves as a baseline. With RNC, the
blacklisting mechanism does not allow to recover the full
video quality for any tblack. As shown in Fig. 4 (right),
even after collecting observations for 300 s the nodes cannot
properly discriminate between honest and malicious nodes.
Conversely, with BC the TPR increases together with tblack,
so the blacklisting mechanism is increasingly more precise
at excluding from the communication true malicious nodes.
By tblack = 250 s, the CI is steadily above 90%, and by
the end of the streaming session the malicious nodes are
correctly identified and blacklisted (W = k2 ). The experiment
shows that packet counts observations collected with BC are
discriminative enough to enable a simple blacklisting scheme
to recover nearly-optimal video quality.
Second, we study the effect of an increase of the probability
ppoll that a malicious node injects a bogus packet. Fig. 5
(left) shows the precision in malicious identification (TPR)
as ppoll increases above 1%. As expected, the experiments
confirm that the honest nodes relay more polluted packets to
the network as ppoll increases. With RNC, the TPR drops
as ppoll increases: as malicious nodes inject more polluted
packets, the ambiguity between honest and malicious nodes
increases and collected observations are less discriminative to
identify the malicious nodes. On the contrary, with BC the
TPR increases as ppoll increases: malicious nodes are in fact
more likely to be correctly identified when they transmit more
polluted packets to the network.
Fig. 5 (right) shows the corresponding post-blacklisting CI
as a function of ppoll for tblack = 200s. As expected, the
CI for the RNC scheme drops quickly as ppoll increases,
i.e. the malicious nodes succeed in compromising the video
communication. Conversely, with BC the CI increases as
ppoll increases, with smaller window sizes W yielding better
performance. This experiment shows that, with our proposed
scheme, injecting more polluted packets in the network may
be counterproductive for malicious nodes as they are more
easily identified and isolated from the network.
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Fig. 5. Precision in malicious nodes identification (left) and video quality
(right) as a function of the packet pollution probability ppoll (tblack = 200
s).
Finally, in Fig. 6 (right) we experiment with the centralized
scheme in Sec. IV-F for W = k2 and σp = 2. The centralized
scheme identifies the malicious nodes restoring near-perfect
video quality in only 200 s as the tracker collects observations
from the whole network The distributed scheme achieves the
same performance in about 300 s as network nodes can collects
observations only from seen nodes. We also experiment with
the malicious nodes attempting to throw blame on honest
nodes. For each transmitted observation, each of the Nm = 20
malicious nodes relays bogus observations by randomly al-
tering the observed nodes identifiers. The distributed scheme
performance worsens as tblack increases as bogus observations
cause the honest nodes scores to drop. Conversely, with our
centralized scheme the number of correct observations avail-
able at the tracker is such that the weight of bogus observations
is marginal only. Concluding, the centralized scheme secures
the network against pollution attacks in less time and is more
resilient to bogus observations in reason of the higher number
of available observations at the price of deploying a centralized
authority in the network.
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Fig. 6. Video quality as a function of blacklisting time tblack for different
coding window sizes Wd (left) and of the observation time to for distributed
and centralized proposed scheme, with and without bogus observations (right).
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We proposed a distributed scheme for identifying and black-
listing malicious nodes on a probabilistic basis in pollution
attacks to Network Coding (NC)-based video communications.
Our approach scales with the network size because is to-
tally distributed and is lightweight because it does not entail
cryptographic primitives. We developed an analytical model
to characterize the probability a node provides packets that
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result in the decoding of a clean or a polluted generation as a
function of the BC coding window W to show its impact
on the accuracy and effectiveness of our scheme. We also
showed that our method allows each node to estimate this
probability for all other nodes. We experimented with P2P
video streaming, demonstrating that our model is accurate and
that our approach enables to precisely isolate the malicious
nodes and restore the security of a video communication in
reasonable time. Notably, the malicious nodes are more likely
to be correctly identified and isolated when they relay more
polluted packets to the network.
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